Therefore, in England, the principle of appprobate and disapproval appears as an expression of the legal doctrine of choice, rather than as a legal doctrine in itself, as is the case in Scotland, and it has been treated as a more flexible principle of broader application than tradition in Scottish law. Doctrine has often been raised around the issue of legal rights, where a beneficiary of a will had to decide whether to receive a bequest or invoke his or her legal rights. As regards the exercise of statutory rights by accepting inheritance, it has been replaced by section 13 of the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964. However, there remains a place for doctrine in Scottish inheritance law. For example, the heirs of a will in Bruce`s Judicial Factor v. Lord Advocate [1969] S.C. 296 had difficulty in asserting the nullity of the revocation clause of the will without approving the rest of the deed. Although the case was decided on the basis of other considerations, Lord Judge-Registrar (Grant) referred to the doctrine in a manner that suggested that its application was appropriate in the present case (ibid., p. 306, where he noted that he did not see how the claimants could overcome “the obstacle of approval and disapproval”). Given the voluntary use of licences and rejection in English cases over a longer period of time, it is perhaps surprising that this has been so rare in Scottish cases.

In this context, their fundamental presumption of application to Redding Park and Highlands and Islands airports (and subject to any appeal in these two cases) may reflect the catch-up process of the Scottish courts, and it is interesting to note that the English courts reflect the Scottish origin of the doctrine. While the Scottish courts` acceptance of extending the doctrine in Scotland beyond its traditional scope can be seen as pragmatic, it also seems compatible with logic and fairness. In future cases, however, further analysis could lead to a clearer legal basis for the extension of Scottish law. Lord Menzies agreed that “the independent expert did not have the power to do what he purported to do” with respect to the second part of the second Finding (ibid., paragraph 51). However, in accepting the defendant`s arguments concerning approval and disapproval, it found that “the applicant who approved the second decision in its entirety is not free to try to convict it in these proceedings” (ibid., paragraph 62) and the application was therefore rejected. This case concerned the attempt to enforce an arbitrator`s decision in relation to a dispute concerning planning and other services provided in connection with construction work at Sumburgh Airport in Shetland. The arbitrator`s decision awarded him a significant payment. Defence counsel wished to oppose the enforcement of this decision and thus the payment on the ground that the arbitrator had rendered his decision in violation of the rules of natural justice, so that the decision was not enforceable. However, the prosecutor argued that defence counsel approved the arbitrator`s decision by his conduct. This was done on the grounds that, after the decision under the contract was rendered, defence counsel had formally informed of his dissatisfaction with the decision and his intention to refer the dispute to an arbitral tribunal for final decision. This case concerned an application for judicial review of an expert finding. The expert had been asked to rule on contentious issues relating to communications concerning the purchase of two parcels of land by the applicant from the defendant.

The parties had agreed that the claimant would carry out renovation work after payment of the purchase price and would then provide the defendant with proof of the certified costs of the work. If the parties are unable to agree on these costs, they will be referred for determination by an independent expert. In Scotland, this term is used to mean that you can agree and disagree. This is a maxim quod approbo non reprobo. For example, if a testator gives his property to A and the property from A to B, A is not free to approve the will to the extent that he receives the inheritance and rejects it in relation to the inheritance of his property to B, in other words, he cannot approve and reject the will. In Thacker Hariram Motiram v. Balkrishan Chatrabhu Thacker,[3] the applicant (tenant) was given one year to rule on the second appeal in an eviction case, provided that he had undertaken within three weeks that the free property would be surrendered within the above-mentioned period. The applicant undertook, in accordance with the above-mentioned conditions, to undertake to leave the premises of the action before 31 December 1985 and to remain empty, i.e. after one year, if “there is no order to suspend the Supreme Court at that time, since I intend to appeal to the Supreme Court”. It was held that, in view of the above-mentioned obligation, the applicant did not rely on the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and had to comply with the conditions of the obligation, and it was stated[4]: “This undertaking, in our view, made by the complainant is in flagrant contradiction with the oral obligation towards the learned judge, which prompted him to give him a year.